Civil Liberties Implications of Computer Searches and Seizures:

Some Proposed Guidelines for Magistrates Who Issue Search Warrants

Submitted by:

Mitchell Kapor, B.A. Yale (1971), M.A. Beacon College (1978)

President, The Electronic Frontier Foundation

Mike Godwin, B.A. University of Texas at Austin (1980), J.D. (1990)

Staff Counsel, The Electronic Frontier Foundation

I. Introduction.

We are now about a decade and a half into the era of affordable

desktop computers. Yet for most people--and especially for the legal

community--the civil-liberties implications of this new consumer

technology have only barely begun to register. Only by acquiring a

knowledge of the new technology, of its uses, and of its importance to

traditional civil liberties can we guarantee the protection of those civil

liberties in the future.

Currently, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is focusing

on two major aspects of this failure of the law-enforcement

community to fully incorporate civil-liberties awareness in its

investigations of computer-related crime:

1) When law enforcement officials lack understanding both of

the new technology and--just as important--of how it is normally used,

they simply cannot conduct the discretion-less, "particular" searches

and seizures required by the Fourth Amendment1 when those searches

and seizures involve computer equipment and data.

2) The electronic conferencing systems offered by computer-

based electronic bulletin-board systems (BBSs), commercial

information services, and noncommercial computer networks--which

may, to various degrees, be subject to law-enforcement searches and

seizures--have created an environment for some of the most vigorous

exercise of First Amendment prerogatives this nation has ever seen.

When law enforcement does not routinely recognize the First

Amendment significance of BBSs and other forms of electronic speech

and publishing, its broad searches and seizures can "chill" the free

exercise of those First Amendment rights.

This paper is adapted from the EFF's response to the American

Bar Association Criminal Justice Section's suggested guidelines for the

issuance of search warrants relating to business records (July 1990)2.

The guidelines seemed to be based in large part on J. McEwan,

Dedicated Computer Crime Units (1989), D. Parker, Computer Crime:

Criminal Justice Resource Manual (1989), and C. Conly, Organizing for

Computer Crime Investigation and Prosecution. Published by the

National Institute of Justice, all three publications were oriented

toward informing law enforcement of the kinds of abuses to which

computer technology potentially lends itself.

But while such a focus may be useful for prosecutors, who may

need to be brought up to speed on the technology, it is not a good focus

for magistrates, who must evaluate law enforcement's claims that

there is probable cause for particular searches and seizures in particular

cases. For example, it may be useful for prosecutors to know that "the

data in the storage device or media can be erased, replaced with other

data, hidden, encrypted, modified, misnamed, misrepresented,

physically destroyed, or otherwise made unusable."3 But this does not

mean that the magistrate should always find probable cause to believe

that a particular computer owner or operator has done so, and then

authorize a highly intrusive and disruptive seizure of a BBS so that

investigators can do a low-level search for hidden or encrypted data.

Similarly, the fact that a clever hobbyist can find criminal uses

for all sorts of equipment does not create probable cause to believe that

every piece of electronic property that could conceivably be used in any

type of computer crime -- or that could conceivably be evidence in

some type of computer crime -- should be seized in every

investigation.4

Moreover, the kind of exhaustive listing of potential computer-

crimes and crime techniques in these references, together with their

instructive but not particularly representative anecdotal evidence,

cannot help but give both law-enforcement agents and magistrates the

impression that BBSs and similar systems are likely to be used for

computer-related crimes of various sorts.

Our criticism of the original ABA Criminal Justice Section

suggested guidelines was basically threefold:

1) There was no guidance to the magistrate as to when the

computer or related equipment should not be seized, either because it

is not necessary as evidence or because such a seizure would intolerably

"chill" the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights or abridge a

property owner's Fourth Amendment rights.

2) There was inadequate recognition of the business or

individual computer owner's interest in continuing with lawful

commercial business, which might be hindered or halted by the seizure

of an expensive computer.

3) There was no effort to measure the actual likelihood that

investigators would find computers equipped with such justice-

obstructing measures as automatic-erasure software or "degausser"

boobytrap hardware, the presence of which might justify a "no-knock"

search and seizure, among other responses.

Section II of this paper, infra, contains the EFF's general

comments on the suggested guidelines. while Section III contains our

amended version of those guidelines.

II. Comments on Proposed Guidelines on Searches and Seizures

A. Searches and seizures of computers used for publishing or

electronic bulletin boards.

While the same legal principles apply to searches and seizures of

computerized records as to other records, when the search is of records

on a computer used for publishing or for operating an electronic

bulletin board system (BBS), the need for particularity is heightened

since the material to be searched may be protected by the First

Amendment. Particularity is also needed because First Amendment

rights of association and statutory rights of privacy may be impinged by

seizure of electronic mail or other private and third-party

correspondence.

Also, seizure of a computer used by a publication or for running

an electronic bulletin board system (BBS) may violate the First

Amendment by acting as a prior restraint on future speech and by

interfering with the rights of expression and association of the operator

and users of the system.

B. No-knock entries because of risk of destruction of data.

We believe the concern with possible destruction of data,

whether stored internally or externally, is overstated in the proposed

commentary. Such a concern can justify a "no-knock" entry only in

rare circumstances on a strong factual showing by law enforcement

personnel. First, we are not aware of any data showing that a device

like a degausser is frequently or commonly used to destroy evidence

during a search. Second, the only data that can be destroyed "at the flip

of a [power] switch" is the relatively small amount of information in

the internal memory (RAM) of a computer, and not information

stored on an internal hard disc. Information is only contained in RAM

when a computer is being actively operated, and then only information

about the current application the computer is running.

Thus, in order for a no-knock entry to be warranted, there must

be credible evidence presented to the judicial officer either that (l) it is

likely that the suspects have a device like a degausser by which data

will be destroyed, or (2) the computer user will be using the computer

for illegal purposes at the time of the search, e.g., when a warrant is

sought at the moment a telephone tap demonstrates that computer

user is in the act of using the computer to illegally access a computer

database without authorization.

C. Searches and seizures when the computer is used for electronic

communications (e-mail).

E-mail and other stored electronic communications are protected

by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2701-2711. E-

mail should thus be protected from search and seizure, unless there is

probable cause to search and seize a specific electronic communication.

Accordingly, if a search is likely to take place of a computer which

provides an e-mail service to users, such as most BBSs, the affiant

should inform the judicial officer of this possibility so that the judicial

officer can establish procedures to ensure that the officers executing the

warrant do not view e-mail for which no probable cause exists, and to

ensure that the BBS computer is not seized unnecessarily as this will

prevent the authorized access of users to their e-mail.

D. Search vs. seizure

We suggest that the commentary make a stronger distinction

between the factors applicable to searches of computers, and those

which demonstrate that the seizure itself of a computer or of discs is

warranted. Because of this, we propose that several of the paragraphs

be rearranged.

E. Seizure of computer discs.

Often, warrants have provided for the wholesale seizure of all

computer discs, without any requirement that the officers executing the

warrant review the data contained on each disc and seize copies only of

relevant files. Because of the voluminous amount of materials that

can be stored on a computer disc, such a seizure is often equivalent to a

prohibited general search, as it permits the seizure of a great many files

for which there is no probable cause to seize. The commentary does

mention the possibility of establishing a procedure to ensure that not

all files on a disc are seized, but we believe this should be further

emphasized.

We believe that that only in the situation where an entire

organization is permeated with fraud or other misconduct is the

wholesale seizure of computer discs appropriate. In all other

circumstances, the search of the computer discs for seizable data should

be conducted on the organization's premises. While this type of on-

premises search may be time-consuming, the same exact procedure is

followed when officers executing a warrant are searching through

hard-copy files for seizable material. The judicial officer should allow

the wholesale seizure of discs and a search off-premises of these discs

for seizable material only if the affiant can present specific factors

which demonstrate a necessity for an off-premises search. Further, if

the judicial officer does permit an off-premises search of the computer

discs, the warrant should require that such a search take place promptly

(presumptively within a matter of days), and that the officers executing

the warrant then promptly copy only the relevant parts of the discs and

immediately return the originals to the owner or custodian.

The citation to Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1985),

does not support the proposition it is cited for, in that it suggests the

description there was sufficiently particular when in fact the Court held

the warrant unconstitutionally overbroad.

F. Seizure of computer where isolated information or records stored on

the computer is the object of the search.

While the seizure of a computer should be authorized when the

computer is the instrumentality of a crime, in most other

circumstances, where officials seek isolated information or records

stored on the computer, seizure should not be authorized. In the first

place, such a seizure would violate the particularity requirement as

many non-seizable records would be seized. Secondly, the seizure may

force a halt to legitimate business operations.

In such circumstances, the judicial officer should require that the

search of the computer hard drive take place at the organization's

premises, and that the officers executing the warrant make copies only

of the seizable files or data.

III. Revisions to Business Record Guidelines and Guideline

Commentary

The original ABA Criminal Justice Section Suggested Guideline

appeared in the form of a two-paragraph "Guideline" articulating the

general principles underlying Constitutional searches and seizures of

business records, followed by four pages of "Commentary" laying out

the legal issues raised by business-record searches and seizures, with a

particular focus on computer-based records. We prepared suggested

modifications to the guideline and to the commentary which

incorporates the discussion in Sections I and II.

A. As to the guideline, the first two paragraphs read as follows:

As is the case generally, the description for searches and seizures

of business records should be so definite that it eliminates officer

discretion in determining which items are covered, which are

not, and when the search must come to an end. However,

because it is not always possible to meet this standard, the

particularity requirement may be applied with less rigidity than

in other settings. The judicial officer, in assessing particularity,

must determine if the description of the records (whether in

writing or electronically maintained) is as specific as the

circumstances allow -- or, in the alternative, whether the

description is sufficiently specific to prevent the searching party

>from unnecessarily examining non-relevant records in order to

find the desired records.

The particularity requirement is most likely to be met when (1)

probable cause exists to seize all the items within a particular

category, as when the entire enterprise is permeated with fraud

or other misconduct, or (2) when the warrant sets out some

objective standard, a limiting feature, that allows the officers to

differentiate between what can and cannot be seized, or (3) when

the application describes as fully as possible, in light of what the

investigators know, what is to be seized, or (4) when the warrant

spells out a method for executing the search that limits the

exposure of non-relevant materials, such as appointing a third-

party monitor.

To this Guideline EFF proposed adding the following paragraph:

"Warrants for computerized records must be drawn narrowly

and with enough specificity to eliminate or minimize the researchers'

discretion and intrusion into other materials stored on the computer.

Seizure of the computer itself, while proper in the limited

circumstances where it is the instrumentality of a crime (as when the

computer is itself a tool directly used to commit telecommunications

fraud), is generally not justified when the object of the search is

evidence stored on the computer, particularly since seizure of the

computer may force a legitimate business to cease operations. Where

the computer being searched is used in the publication or

communication of information, warrants must be drawn even more

narrowly to avoid infringing on First Amendment rights of expression

and association, and seizures of such computers may also violate First

Amendment rights unless the computer is the instrumentality of a

crime."

In the commentary, the additions we suggested are underlined, and at

any point where we suggest deleting some material we have indicated

this by brackets ([]). In addition, our proposal rearranged several of the

paragraphs:

(Beginning after Second Paragraph on p. 39)

When the records are electronically stored in a computer, as is

frequently the situation, the same legal principles apply. [] In most

respects, search and seizure issues in computer cases are like those in

other criminal cases. J. McEWAN, DEDICATED COMPUTER CRIME

UNITS 55-56 (189); CF. D. PARKER, COMPUTER CRIME: CRIMINAL

JUSTICE RESOURCE MANUAL (1989).

When computerized records are sought, they must be described,

as in the case with written records, with enough specificity to eliminate

or minimize the searchers' discretion as to what may be examined and

seized. When the information sought can be made definite (e.g., a

memorandum from sales manager Jones to field agent Smith, dated

March 11, 1980, concerning the sale of certain chemicals), the

particularity requirement is easily satisfied whether the record is in

writing or electronically stored. If it is likely that the record of this

document exists only in electronic form, the particular computer and

storage media should be identified, and the affidavit should be clear

that the searchers have the technical capacity to access the information.

The need for particularity is heightened where the computer to

be searched is used for a newspaper, magazine, electronic publishing or

to operate an electronic bulletin board.5 There are "special restraints

upon searches for and seizures of material arguably protected by the

First Amendment." Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 n.5

(1970). Where the materials to be seized may be protected by the First

Amendment, both the particularity requirement and the probable

cause requirement must be met with "scrupulous exactitude." See, e.g.,

Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 405 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting Stanford

v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) and citing Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,

436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978).

In addition, when a computer used to operate a BBS is searched,

there is significant danger that First Amendment rights of association

and statutory rights of privacy may be impinged by seizure of electronic

mail (e-mail) or other private communications which have no relation

to the alleged criminal activity justifying the search. Seizure and

search of e-mail isgoverned by the procedures of the Electronic

Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2701-2711. Similarly, seizure

of material on a BBS meant for publication or dissemination which is

not related to the alleged crime may violate First Amendment rights of

free expression.

When the affiant describes [] the records to be seized only in

general terms, such as "books, letters, papers, memoranda, contracts,

files, computer tape logs, computer operation manuals, and computer

tape printouts," there is a likelihood that the particularity

requirements have not been met. In such a circumstance, the judicial

officer should question the affiant to see whether any additional

limiting standards -- time period, authorship, transaction, or offense,

for example -- can be established. The more limitations in the affidavit,

the more likely that Fourth Amendment particularity exists.6

In some instances, the affidavit may contemplate so extensive a

seizure of computerized data that a successful search would cripple the

business. Under these circumstances,the judicial officer should explore

with the applicant the feasibility of copying or otherwise acquiring the

information sought without depriving the owner or custodian of its

use. Since the justification for a search is to gather evidence, not close a

business, it is important that the seizure be no more intrusive than

necessary. To this end, the judicial officer may require the applicant to

demonstrate technical expertise or access to such.

One troubling problem arises from the way computerized

records are stored. Because computer discs have such a large storage

capacity, it is common to store unrelated data on the same disc. This

means that a seizure of an entire disc may involve substantial amounts

of information that is not relevant to the inquiry. When the discs are

maintained by an innocent third party, such as a large accounting firm,

the invasion of privacy is compounded, since the relevant discs may

also contain data for other clients of the firm. To protect the rights of

these third parties, special procedures may be necessary.

Similarly, the wholesale seizure of a large number of computer

discs would appear to violate the particularity requirement, and be a

prohibited general search, in a situation where the entire organization

is not permeated with fraud or other misconduct.7 In such cases, the

search of the computer discs for seizable items preferably should be

conducted on the organization's premises. Wholesale removal of discs

for off-premises searches should be authorized only if identifiable

particular circumstances so mandate, and in such case the officers

executing the warrant should promptly copy only relevant parts of the

discs and promptly return the discs to the owner or custodian.

To limit the scope of the seizure and the invasion of the rights of

the third parties, and to protect the owner's rights (and the custodian as

well), the judicial officer should consider (1) appointing an expert to

accompany the law enforcement officers on the search to provide

guidance to them in identifying the named items; (2) directing that all

searches of discs for seizable items be conducted on the organization's

premises, and (3) in situations where an on-premise search of the discs

is not feasible because of specific reasons, establishing a procedure

whereby the relevant parts of the disc may be promptly copied and then

the original returned to the owner or custodian within a reasonable

period of time, presumptively no longer than several days.

The computer itself may be subject to seizure when it is an

instrumentality for the commission of an offense, for example when it

is employed to commit a host of illegal acts: software piracy,

embezzlement, and telecommunications fraud are among these.8 For

a fuller description of offenses committed with computers, see

McEWAN, DEDICATED COMPUTER CRIME, Units 1-5, 38 (1989).

Computers may also serve criminal enterprises by maintaining

databases of, for example, drug distributions or customers for child

pornography. In terms of establishing probable cause and particularity,

the affidavit must, as is generally true, provide reason to believe that

an offense has been committed, and that the object to be seized -- the

computer -- is implicated. The computer should be identified as fully

as possible, i.e., by manufacturer, model number and serial number to

meet the particularity requirement.

Seizure of the computer itself should not be authorized where

information or records stored on the computer are the only object of

the search. Such computer seizures and the attendant seizure of all

data on the computer's hard drive would not meet the particularity

requirement. In addition, as with the wholesale seizure of

computerized records, the seizure of the computer will often make it

impossible for a lawful business to continue operating. If the computer

is used for publishing or communicating information, e.g., if it is used

by a newspaper, publication or for running a BBS, seizure may violate

the First Amendment, because the seizure may act as a prior restraint

on future speech or may interfere with the rights of expression and

association of the operator and users of the system.

Because a computer is actually a system of several parts, the

affidavit should specify what exactly is to be seized. An expert may be

necessary in order to ensure a complete and precise listing.

When the affidavit, of necessity, employs technical language to

explain the offense involved, such as "patching a long distance phone

call to avoid paying the toll," See Ottensmeyer v. Chesapeake and

Potomac Tel. Co., 756 F.2d 986 (4th Cir. 1985), the affiant's credentials,

training, and education in computer sciences should be set forth so that

the judicial officer has a basis for evaluating the analysis and

interpretation in the affidavit. In unusual situations when the judicial

officer has difficulty comprehending the nature of the offense alleged,

or questions the expertise of the affiant or the affiant's witnesses, the

judicial officer can summon an expert witness to provide additional

testimony. Ordinarily, however, the procedure is to require the affiant

to further supplement the affidavit, or attempt to rewrite it to meet the

judicial officer's objections. The judicial officer may also require an

expert to accompany the affiant in order to insure that the seizable

items are properly identified and removed in a reasonable manner to

avoid injury to property, [] needless exposure of unrelated records, or

infringement of First Amendment rights. In Ottensmeyer, 756 F.2d at

986, an expert accompanied the searching party. Cf. De Massa v.

Nunez, 747 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1984) (special master appointed to

supervise the seizure of documents during execution of warrant at

attorney's office); Forro Precision Inc. v. International Business

Machine Corp., 673 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussing the role of an

expert during the execution of the warrant).

Because computer systems increasingly rely on complicated

access procedures and may also have the capacity to destroy data when

an unauthorized user attempts to access them there is an additional

need for expertise. The judicial officer should make sure that the

officers executing the warrant have the capacity to make the seizure

without destroying data or damaging property unnecessarily, and thus

may appoint an outside expert to monitor or supervise the execution of

the warrant. The appointment of an expert provides added assurance

that (1) there will not be an inadvertent interruption in the electric

power during data manipulation by the officers that could result in the

loss of information, (2) that if there is a hard disc drive, the heads on

the drive will be "parked" before moving the system to avoid

destroying stored information, (3) that when such equipment as

telephone modems, auto-dialers, and printers are connected to the

computer, they will be disconnected without loss of information, and

(4) that the officers executing the search warrant will not

unintentionally change data while collecting evidence. See generally,

C. CONLY, ORGANIZING FOR COMPUTER CRIME INVESTIGATION

AND PROSECUTION 22 (1989).

IV. Conclusion.

These suggestions were submitted to the ABA through Judge

William R. McMahon of Ohio, who chairs the ABA, NCSCJ committee

on Modern Technology and the Courts. It is the EFF's hope that these

suggestions can also be used as a resource by state and federal

legislatures, by state and federal judiciaries, and--perhaps most

importantly--by the front-line law-enforcement officials and

prosecutors whose job it is to integrate the enforcement of the law with

the preservation of our civil liberties.

1The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that "The

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the

place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

2Sections II and III of this paper were originally researched and

written for EFF by Nick Poser, Esq., and Terry Gross, Esq., of

Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman. Harvey

Silverglate, Esq., and Sharon Beckman, Esq., of Silverglate & Good

reviewed these sections and offered valuable suggestions and

comments.

3D. Parker, Computer Crime: Criminal Justice Resource Manual

(1989), page 68.

4 A "sample" search warrant in Conly, Organizing for Computer

Crime Investigation and Prosecution includes the following

language:

"In the County of Baltimore, there is now property subject to

seizure, such as computers, keyboards, central processing units,

external and/or internal drives, internal and/or external

storage devices such as magnetic tapes and/or disks, terminals

and/or video display units and/or receiving devices and

peripheral equipment such as, but not limited to, printers,

automatic dialers, modems, acoustic couplers, and or [sic] direct

line couplers, peripheral interface boards and connecting cables

or ribbons, diaries, logs, and other records, correspondence,

journals, ledgers memoranda [sic], computer software,

programs and source documentation, computer logs, magnetic

audio tapes and recorders used in the obtaining, maintenance,

and or [sic] dissemination of information obtained from the

official files and computers of the [sic] MCI

Telecommunications Inc. and other evidence of the offense."

Although clearly taken from a warrant drafted for a specific

crime involving MCI, this language is frequently copied almost

verbatim in warrants involving far different crimes. Moreover, the

drafters, perhaps afraid that their language was not sufficiently

inclusive, made sure to add the phrase "such as, but not limited to"

in reference to what qualifies as a "peripheral" for the purposes of the

warrant. One may wonder how such a broad description meets the

"particularly describing" clause of the Fourth Amendment, or how it

limits the discretion of the executing officer as to which property he

or she will seize.

5 There is growing recognition that bulletin board systems (BBSs) are

a form of press. See, e.g., An Electronic Soapbox: Computer Bulletin

Boards and the First Amendment, 39 Fed. Com. L. J. 217, 240 (1988),

citing Legi-Tech, Inc. v. Keiper, 766 F.2d 728, 734-36 (2d Cir. 1985).

6Two problems, unrelated to particularity, may arise with respect to

the seizure of computerized data. [] First, in certain circumstances,

affiants may have specific information that the suspects have devices

by which computerized data may be rapidly destroyed, and in such

cases affiants may seek permission to enter the premises without

announcing their authority and purpose. Affiants may also seek such

permission in cases where it is known that the suspect will be using

the computer for illegal purposes at the time of the search, e.g., when

a warrant is sought at the moment a telephone tap demonstrates that

the computer user is in the act of illegally accessing a computer

database over the telephone lines, as evidence of the crime could be

lost if the computer user shuts off the computer. For an analysis of

the standard for "no-knock" entries in business premises see

Guideline 10.3 infra.

The second problem relates to the time period in which the

computerized data are stored. In addition, unlike written records,

data internal to the system are not likely to be so maintained for long

periods. Although computers commonly have book-length or longer

storage capacity, the typical procedure is to transfer the data to

external storage, typically in the form of a disc or tape. Given the

practice, the judicial officer must evaluate the affidavit with care to

ascertain the likelihood that the data is in the computer and has not

been transferred to a different location or erased. If electronic

communications are maintained on the computer, such as with

computers operating electronic bulletin boards, reference must be

made to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2701-

2711, and the affiants should inform the judicial officer, so that he can

establish procedures to ensure that the privacy of these

communications is protected, and that no communications are

searched unless probable cause exists as to that communication.

7 Generic listings which would permit the seizure of virtually all

computer related materials fail to meet the particularity requirement.

See, e.g., Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 407 (10th Cir. 1985), []

(affidavit held insufficient which described the computer records and

materials to be seized as follows: "One Alpha Micro computer

processing unit, approximately four Alpha Micro computer

terminals, computer printers, and computer manuals, logs, printout

files, operating instructions, including coded and handwritten

notations, and computer storage materials, including magnetic tapes,

magnetic discs, floppy discs, programs and computer source

documents"

8A computer is certainly "property" and hence theoretically might be

subject to seizure if it is forfeitable pursuant to a specific statute

authorizing such forfeiture, e.g., the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. $ 1913. Because a computer is

also a communications device much as a typewriter or printing press

is, however, seizure of the computer raises First Amendment issues

not present in other types of forfeitures. For this reason, the better

procedure when dealing with an arguably forfeitable computer

system is not to seize it, which raises First Amendment and prior-

restraint problems, but to allow the government to proceed instead by

subpoena or motion, where the delicate issues can be litigated

without the prior restraint that seizure pendente lite would cause.

--

Mike Godwin, (617) 864-0665 | "You gotta put down the ducky

mnemonic@eff.org | if you wanna play the saxophone."

Electronic Frontier |

Foundation |