Concerning Hackers Who Break into Computer
Systems
Dorothy E. Denning
Digital Equipment Corp., Systems Research Center
130 Lytton Ave., Palo Alto, CA 94301
415-853-2252, denning@src.dec.com
To be presented at the 13th National Computer Security Conference,
Washington, D.C., Oct. 1-4, 1990.
Abstract
A diffuse group of people often called ``hackers'' has been characterized as unethical,
irresponsible, and a serious danger to society for actions related to breaking into
computer systems. This paper attempts to construct a picture of hackers, their concerns,
and the discourse in which hacking takes place. My initial findings suggest that hackers
are learners and explorers who want to help rather than cause damage, and who often have
very high standards of behavior. My findings also suggest that the discourse surrounding
hacking belongs at the very least to the gray areas between larger conflicts that we are
experiencing at every level of society and business in an information age where many are
not computer literate. These conflicts are between the idea that information cannot be
owned and the idea that it can, and between law enforcement and the First and Fourth
Amendments. Hackers have raised serious issues about values and practices in an
information society. Based on my findings, I recommend that we work closely with hackers,
and suggest several actions that might be taken.
1. Introduction
The world is crisscrossed with many different networks that are used to deliver
essential services and basic necessities -- electric power, water, fuel, food, goods, to
name a few. These networks are all publicly accessible and hence vulnerable to attacks,
and yet virtually no attacks or disruptions actually occur.
The world of computer networking seems to be an anomaly in the firmament of networks.
Stories about attacks, breakins, disruptions, theft of information, modification of files,
and the like appear frequently in the newspapers. A diffuse group called ``hackers'' is
often the target of scorn and blame for these actions. Why are computer networks any
different from other vulnerable public networks? Is the difference the result of growing
pains in a young field? Or is it the reflection of deeper tensions in our emerging
information society?
There are no easy or immediate answers to these questions. Yet it is important to our
future in a networked, information-dependent world that we come to grips with them. I am
deeply interested in them. This paper is my report of what I have discovered in the early
stages of what promises to be a longer investigation. I have concentrated my attention in
these early stages on the hackers themselves. Who are they? What do they say? What
motivates them? What are their values? What do that have to say about public policies
regarding information and computers? What do they have to say about computer security?
From such a profile I expect to be able to construct a picture of the discourses in
which hacking takes place. By a discourse I mean the invisible background of assumptions
that transcends individuals and governs our ways of thinking, speaking, and acting. My
initial findings lead me to conclude that this discourse belongs at the very least to the
gray areas between larger conflicts that we are experiencing at every level of society and
business, the conflict between the idea that information cannot be owned and the idea that
it can, and the conflict between law enforcement and the First and Fourth Amendments.
But, enough of the philosophy. On with the story!
2. Opening Moves
In late fall of 1989, Frank Drake (not his real name), Editor of the now defunct
cyberpunk magazine W.O.R.M., invited me to be interviewed for the magazine. In accepting
the invitation, I hoped that something I might say would discourage hackers from breaking
into systems. I was also curious about the hacker culture. This seemed like a good
opportunity to learn about it.
The interview was conducted electronically. I quickly discovered that I had much more
to learn from Drake's questions than to teach. For example, he asked: ``Is providing
computer security for large databases that collect information on us a real service? How
do you balance the individual's privacy vs. the corporations?'' This question surprised
me. Nothing that I had read about hackers ever suggested that they might care about
privacy. He also asked: ``What has [the DES] taught us about what the government's
(especially NSA's) role in cryptography should be?'' Again, I was surprised to discover a
concern for the role of the government in computer security. I did not know at the time
that I would later discover considerable overlap in the issues discussed by hackers and
those of other computer professionals.
I met with Drake to discuss his questions and views. After our meeting, we continued
our dialog electronically with me interviewing him. This gave me the opportunity to
explore his views in greater depth. Both interviews appear in ``Computers Under Attack,''
edited by Peter Denning [DenningP90].
My dialog with Drake increased my curiosity about hackers. I read articles and books by
or about hackers. In addition, I had discussions with nine hackers whom I will not mention
by name. Their ages ranged from 17 to 28.
The word ``hacker'' has taken on many different meanings ranging from 1) ``a person who
enjoys learning the details of computer systems and how to stretch their capabilities'' to
2) ``a malicious or inquisitive meddler who tries to discover information by poking around
.. possibly by deceptive or illegal means ...'' [Steele83] The hackers described in this
paper satisfy both of these definitions, although all of the hackers I spoke with said
they did not engage in or approve of malicious acts that damage systems or files. Thus,
this paper is not about malicious hackers. Indeed, my research so far suggests that there
are very few malicious hackers. Neither is this paper about career criminals who, for
example, defraud businesses, or about people who use stolen credit cards to purchase
goods. The characteristics of many of the hackers I am writing about are summed up in the
words of one of the hackers: ``A hacker is someone that experiments with systems...
[Hacking] is playing with systems and making them do what they were never intended to do.
Breaking in and making free calls is just a small part of that. Hacking is also about
freedom of speech and free access to information -- being able to find out anything. There
is also the David and Goliath side of it, the underdog vs. the system, and the ethic of
being a folk hero, albeit a minor one.''
Richard Stallman, founder of the Free Software Foundation who calls himself a hacker
according to the first sense of the word above, recommends calling security-breaking
hackers ``crackers'' [Stallman84]. While this description may be more accurate, I shall
use the term ``hacker'' since the people I am writing about call themselves hackers and
all are interested in learning about computer and communication systems. However, there
are many people like Stallman who call themselves hackers and do not engage in illegal or
deceptive practices; this paper is also not about those hackers.
In what follows I will report on what I have learned about hackers from hackers. I will
organize the discussion around the principal domains of concerns I observed. I recommend
Meyer's thesis [Meyer89] for a more detailed treatment of the hackers' social culture and
networks, and Meyer and Thomas [MeyerThomas90] for an interesting interpretation of the
computer underground as a postmodernist rejection of conventional culture that substitutes
``rational technological control of the present for an anarchic and playful future.''
I do not pretend to know all the concerns that hackers have, nor do I claim to have
conducted a scientific study. Rather, I hope that my own informal study motivates others
to explore the area further. It is essential that we as computer security professionals
take into account hackers' concerns in the design of our policies, procedures, laws
regulating computer and information access, and educational programs. Although I speak
about security-breaking hackers as a group, their competencies, actions, and views are not
all the same. Thus, it is equally important that our policies and programs take into
account individual differences.
In focusing on what hackers say and do, I do not mean for a moment to set aside the
concerns of the owners and users of systems that hackers break into, the concerns of law
enforcement personnel, or our own concerns as computer security professionals. But I do
recommend that we work closely with hackers as well as these other groups to design new
approaches and programs for addressing the concerns of all. Like ham radio operators,
hackers exist, and it is in our best interest that we learn to communicate and work with
them rather than against them.
I will suggest some actions that we might consider taking, and I invite others to
reflect on these and suggest their own. Many of these suggestions are from the hackers
themselves; others came from the recommendations of the ACM Panel on Hacking [Lee86] and
from colleagues.
I grouped the hackers' concerns into five categories: access to computers and
information for learning; thrill, excitement and challenge; ethics and avoiding damage;
public image and treatment; and privacy and first amendment rights. These are discussed in
the next five subsections. I have made an effort to present my findings as uncritical
observations. The reader should not infer that I either approve or disapprove of actions
hackers take.
3. Access to Computers and Information for Learning
Although Levy's book ``Hackers'' [Levy84] is not about today's security-breaking
hackers, it articulates and interprets a ``hacker ethic'' that is shared by many of these
hackers. The ethic includes two key principles that were formulated in the early days of
the AI Lab at MIT: ``Access to computers -- and anything which might teach you something
about the way the world works -- should be unlimited and total,'' and ``All information
should be free.'' In the context in which these principles were formulated, the computers
of interest were research machines and the information was software and systems
information.
Since Stallman is a leading advocate of open systems and freedom of information,
especially software, I asked him what he means by this. He said: ``I believe that all
generally useful information should be free. By `free' I am not referring to price, but
rather to the freedom to copy the information and to adapt it to one's own uses.'' By
``generally useful'' he does not include confidential information about individuals or
credit card information, for example. He further writes: ``When information is generally
useful, redistributing it makes humanity wealthier no matter who is distributing and no
matter who is receiving.'' Stallman has argued strongly against user interface copyright,
claiming that it does not serve the users or promote the evolutionary process
[Stallman90].
I asked hackers whether all systems should be accessible and all information should be
free. They said that it is OK if some systems are closed and some information, mainly
confidential information about individuals, is not accessible. They make a distinction
between information about security technology, e.g., the DES, and confidential information
protected by that technology, arguing that it is the former that should be accessible.
They said that information hoarding is inefficient and slows down evolution of technology.
They also said that more systems should be open so that idle resources are not wasted. One
hacker said that the high costs of communication hurts the growth of the information
economy.
These views of information sharing seem to go back at least as far as the 17th and 18th
Centuries. Samuelson [Samuelson89] notes that ``The drafters of the Constitution, educated
in the Enlightenment tradition, shared that era's legacy of faith in the enabling powers
of knowledge for society as well as the individual.'' She writes that our current
copyright laws, which protect the expression of information, but not the information
itself, are based on the belief that unfettered and widespread dissemination of
information promotes technological progress. (Similarly for patent laws which protect
devices and processes, not the information about them.) She cites two recent court cases
where courts reversed the historical trend and treated information as ownable property.
She raises questions about whether in entering the Information Age where information is
the source of greatest wealth, we have outgrown the Enlightenment tradition and are coming
to treat information as property.
In a society where knowledge is said to be power, Drake expressed particular concern
about what he sees as a growing information gap between the rich and poor. He would like
to see information that is not about individuals be made public, although it could still
be owned. He likes to think that companies would actually find it to their advantage to
share information. He noted how IBM's disclosure of the PC allowed developers to make more
products for the computers, and how Adobe's disclosure of their fonts helped them compete
against the Apple-Microsoft deal. He recognizes that in our current political framework,
it is difficult to make all information public, because complicated structures have been
built on top of an assumption that certain information will be kept secret. He cites our
defense policy, which is founded on secrecy for military information, as an example.
Hackers say they want access to information and computing and network resources in
order to learn. Both Levy [Levy84] and Landreth [Landreth89] note that hackers have an
intense, compelling interest in computers and learning, and many go into computers as a
profession. Some hackers break into systems in order to learn more about how the systems
work. Landreth says these hackers want to remain undiscovered so that they can stay on the
system as long as possible. Some of them devote most of their time to learning how to
break the locks and other security mechanisms on systems; their background in systems and
programming varies considerably. One hacker wrote ``A hacker sees a security hole and
takes advantage of it because it is there, not to destroy information or steal. I think
our activities would be analogous to someone discovering methods of acquiring information
in a library and becoming excited and perhaps engrossed.''
We should not underestimate the effectiveness of the networks in which hackers learn
their craft. They do research, learn about systems, work in groups, write, and teach
others. One hacker said that he belongs to a study group with the mission of churning out
files of information and learning as much as possible. Within the group, people
specialize, collaborate on research project, share information and news, write articles,
and teach other about their areas of specialization. Hackers have set up a private system
of education that engages them, teaches them to think, and allows them to apply their
knowledge in purposeful, if not always legal, activity. Ironically, many of our nation's
classrooms have been criticized for providing a poor learning environment that seems to
emphasize memorization rather than thinking and reasoning. One hacker reported that
through volunteer work with a local high school, he was trying to get students turned on
to learning.
Many hackers say that the legitimate computer access they have through their home and
school computers do not meet their needs. One student told me that his high school did not
offer anything beyond elementary courses in BASIC and PASCAL, and that he was bored by
these. Hans Huebner, a hacker in Germany who goes by the name Pengo, wrote in a note to
the RISKS Forum [Huebner89] : ``I was just interested in computers, not in the data which
has been kept on their disks. As I was going to school at that time, I didn't even have
the money to buy [my] own computer. Since CP/M (which was the most sophisticated OS I
could use on machines which I had legal access to) didn't turn me on anymore, I enjoyed
the lax security of the systems I had access to by using X.25 networks. You might point
out that I should have been patient and wait[ed] until I could go to the university and
use their machines. Some of you might understand that waiting was just not the thing I was
keen on in those days.''
Brian Harvey, in his position paper [Harvey86] for the ACM Panel on Hacking, claims
that the computer medium available to students, e.g., BASIC and floppy disks, is
inadequate for challenging intellectual work. His recommendation is that students be given
access to real computing power, and that they be taught how to use that power responsibly.
He describes a program he created at a public high school in Massachusetts during the
period 1979-1982. They installed a PDP-11/70 and let students and teachers carry out the
administration of the system. Harvey assessed that putting the burden of dealing with the
problems of malicious users on the students themselves was a powerful educational force.
He also noted that the students who had the skill and interest to be password hackers were
discouraged from this activity because they also wanted to keep the trust of their
colleagues in order that they could acquire ``superuser'' status on the system.
Harvey also makes an interesting analogy between teaching computing and teaching
karate. In karate instruction, students are introduced to the real, adult community. They
are given access to a powerful, deadly weapon, and at the same time are taught discipline
and to not abuse the art. Harvey speculates that the reason that students do not misuse
their power is that they know they are being trusted with something important, and they
want to live up to that trust. Harvey applied this principle when he set up the school
system.
The ACM panel endorsed Harvey's recommendation, proposing a three-tiered computing
environment with local, district-wide, and nation-wide networks. They recommended that
computer professionals participate in this effort as mentors and role models. They also
recommended that outside of schools, government and industry be encouraged to establish
regional computing centers using donated or re-cycled equipment; that students be
apprenticed to local companies either part-time on a continuing basis or on a periodic
basis; and, following a suggestion from Felsenstein [Felsenstein86] for a ``Hacker's
League,'' that a league analogous to the Amateur Radio Relay League be established to make
contributed resources available for educational purposes.
Drake said he liked these recommendations. He said that if hackers were given access to
powerful systems through a public account system, they would supervise themselves. He also
suggested that Computer Resource Centers be established in low-income areas in order to
help the poor get access to information. Perhaps hackers could help run the centers and
teach the members of the community how to use the facilities. One of my colleagues
suggested cynically that the hackers would only use this to teach the poor how to hack
rich people's systems. A hacker responded by saying this was ridiculous; hackers would not
teach people how to break into systems, but rather how to use computers effectively and
not be afraid of them. In addition, the hackers I spoke with who had given up illegal
activities said they stopped doing so when they got engaged in other work.
Geoff Goodfellow and Richard Stallman have reported that they have given hackers
accounts on systems that they manage, and that the hackers have not misused the trust
granted to them. Perhaps universities could consider providing accounts to pre-college
students on the basis of recommendations from their teachers or parents. The students
might be challenged to work on the same homework problems assigned in courses or to
explore their own interests. Students who strongly dislike the inflexibility of classroom
learning might excel in an environment that allows them to learn on their own, in much the
way that hackers have done.
4. Thrill, Excitement, and Challenge
One hacker wrote that ``Hackers understand something basic about computers, and that is
that they can be enjoyed. I know none who hack for money, or hack to frighten the company,
or hack for anything but fun.''
In the words of another hacker, ``Hacking was the ultimate cerebral buzz for me. I
would come home from another dull day at school, turn my computer on, and become a member
of the hacker elite. It was a whole different world where there were no condescending
adults and you were judged only by your talent. I would first check in to the private
Bulletin Boards where other people who were like me would hang out, see what the news was
in the community, and trade some info with people across the country. Then I would start
actually hacking. My brain would be going a million miles an hour and I'd basically
completely forget about my body as I would jump from one computer to another trying to
find a path into my target. It was the rush of working on a puzzle coupled with the high
of discovery many magnitudes intensified. To go along with the adrenaline rush was the
illicit thrill of doing something illegal. Every step I made could be the one that would
bring the authorities crashing down on me. I was on the edge of technology and exploring
past it, spelunking into electronic caves where I wasn't supposed to be.''
The other hackers I spoke with made similar statements about the fun and challenge of
hacking. In SPIN magazine [Dibbel90], reporter Julian Dibbell speculated that much of the
thrill comes from the dangers associated with the activity, writing that ``the technology
just lends itself to cloak-and-dagger drama,'' and that ``hackers were already living in a
world in which covert action was nothing more than a game children played.''
Eric Corley [Corley89] characterizes hacking as an evolved form of mountain climbing.
In describing an effort to construct a list of active mailboxes on a Voice Messaging
System, he writes ``I suppose the main reason I'm wasting my time pushing all these
buttons is simply so that I can make a list of something that I'm not supposed to have and
be the first person to accomplish this.'' He said that he was not interested in obtaining
an account of his own on the system. Gordon Meyer says he found this to be a recurring
theme: ``We aren't supposed to be able to do this, but we can'' -- so they do.
One hacker said he was now working on anti-viral programming. He said it was almost as
much fun as breaking into systems, and that it was an intellectual battle against the
virus author.
5. Ethics and Avoiding Damage
All of the hackers I spoke with said that malicious hacking was morally wrong. They
said that most hackers are not intentionally malicious, and that they themselves are
concerned about causing accidental damage. When I asked Drake about the responsibility of
a person with a PC and modem, his reply included not erasing or modifying anyone else's
data, and not causing a legitimate user on a system any problems. Hackers say they are
outraged when other hackers cause damage or use resources that would be missed, even if
the results are unintentional and due to incompetence. One hacker wrote ``I have ALWAYS
strived to do NO damage, and inconvenience as few people as possible. I NEVER, EVER, EVER
DELETE A FILE. One of the first commands I do on a new system is disable the delete file
command.'' Some hackers say that it is unethical to give passwords and similar
security-related information to persons who might do damage. In the recent incident where
a hacker broke into Bell South and downloaded a text file on the emergency 911 service,
hackers say that there was no intention to use this knowledge to break into or sabotage
the 911 system. According to Emmanuel Goldstein [Goldstein90], the file did not even
contain information about how to break into the 911 system.
The hackers also said that some break-ins were unethical, e.g., breaking into hospital
systems, and that it is wrong to read confidential information about individuals or steal
classified information. All said it was wrong to commit fraud for personal profit.
Although we as computer security professionals often disagree with hackers about what
constitutes damage, the ethical standards listed sound much like our own. Where the
hackers' ethics differs from the standards adopted by most in the computer security
community is that hackers say it is not unethical to break into many systems, use idle
computer and communications resources, and download system files in order to learn.
Goldstein says that hacking is not wrong: it is not the same as stealing, and uncovers
design flaws and security deficiencies [Goldstein89].
Brian Reid speculates that a hacker's ethics may come from not being raised properly as
a civilized member of society, and not appreciating the rules of living in society. One
hacker responded to this with ``What does `being brought up properly' mean? Some would say
that it is `good' to keep to yourself, mind your own business. Others might argue that it
is healthy to explore, take risks, be curious and discover.'' Brian Harvey [Harvey86]
notes that many hackers are adolescents, and that adolescents are at a less developed
stage of moral development than adults, where they might not see how the effects of their
actions hurt others. Larry Martin [Martin89] claims that parents, teachers, the press, and
others in society are not aware of their responsibility to contribute to instilling
ethical values associated with computer use. This could be the consequence of the youth of
the computing field; many people are still computer illiterate and cultural norms may be
lagging behind advances in technology and the growing dependency on that technology by
businesses and society. Hollinger and Lanza-Kaduce speculate that the cultural normative
messages about the use and abuse of computer technology have been driven by the adaption
of criminal laws [HollingerLanza-Kaduce88], which have been mainly in the last decade.
They also speculate that hacking may be encouraged during the process of becoming computer
literate. Some of my colleagues say that hackers are irresponsible. One hacker responded
``I think it's a strong indication of the amount of responsibility shown that so FEW
actually DAMAGING incidents are known.''
But we must not overlook that the differences in ethics also reflect a difference in
philosophy about information and information handling resources; whereas hackers advocate
sharing, we seem to be advocating ownership as property. The differences also represent an
opportunity to examine our own ethical behavior and our practices for information sharing
and protection. For example, one hacker wrote ``I will accept that it is morally wrong to
copy some proprietary software, however, I think that it is morally wrong to charge $6000
for a program that is only around 25K long.'' Hence, I shall go into a few of the ethical
points raised by hackers more closely. It is not a simple case of good or mature (us)
against bad or immature (hackers), or of teaching hackers a list of rules.
Many computer professionals argue the moral questions by analogy, e.g., see Martin
[Martin89]. The analogies are then used to justify their judgement of a hacker's actions
as unethical. Breaking into a system is compared with breaking into a house, and
downloading information and using computer and telecommunications services is compared
with stealing tangible goods. But, say hackers, the situations are not the same. When
someone breaks into a house, the objective is to steal goods, which are often
irreplaceable, and property is often damaged in the process. By contrast, when a hacker
breaks into a system, the objective is to learn and avoid causing damage. Downloaded
information is copied, not stolen, and still exists on the original system. Moreover, as
noted earlier, information has not been traditionally regarded as property. Dibbel
[Dibbel90] says that when the software industries and phone companies claim losses of
billions of dollars to piracy, they are not talking about goods that disappear from the
shelves and could have been sold.
We often say that breaking into a system implies a lack of caring for the system's
owner and authorized users. But, one hacker says that the ease of breaking into a system
reveals a lack of caring on the part of the system manager to protect user and company
assets, or failure on the part of vendors to warn managers about the vulnerabilities of
their systems. He estimated his success rate of getting in at 10-15%, and that is without
spending more than an hour on any one target system. Another hacker says that he sees
messages from vendors notifying the managers, but that the managers fail to take action.
Richard Pethia of CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) reports that they seldom see
cases of malicious damage caused by hackers, but that the break-ins are nevertheless
disruptive because system users and administrators want to be sure that nothing was
damaged. (CERT suggests that sites reload system software from secure backups and change
all user passwords in order to protect against possible back doors and Trojan Horses that
might have been planted by the hacker. Pethia also noted that prosecutors are generally
called for government sites, and are being called for non-government sites with increasing
frequency.) Pethia says that break-ins also generate a loss of trust in the computing
environment, and may lead to adoption of new policies that are formulated in a panic or
management edicts that severely restrict connectivity to outside systems. Brian Harvey
says that hackers cause damage by increasing the amount of paranoia, which in turn leads
to tighter security controls that diminish the quality of life for the users. Hackers
respond to these points by saying they are the scapegoats for systems that are not
adequately protected. They say that the paranoia is generated by ill-founded fears and
media distortions (I will return to this point later), and that security need not be
oppressive to keep hackers out; it is mainly making sure that passwords and system
defaults are well-chosen.
Pethia says that some intruders seem to be disruptive to prove a point, such as that
the systems are vulnerable, the security personnel are incompetent, or ``it's not nice to
say bad things about hackers.'' In the N.Y. Times, John Markoff [Markoff90] wrote that the
hacker who claimed to have broken into Cliff Stoll's system said he was upset by Stoll's
portrayal of hackers in ``The Cuckoo's Egg'' [Stoll90]. Markoff reported that the caller
said: ``He [Stoll] was going on about how he hates all hackers, and he gave pretty much of
a one-sided view of who hackers are.''
``The Cuckoo's Egg'' captures much of the popular stereotypes of hackers. Criminologist
Jim Thomas criticizes it for presenting a simplified view of the world, one where
everything springs from the forces of light (us) or of darkness (hackers) [Thomas90]. He
claims that Stoll fails to see the similarities between his own activities (e.g.,
monitoring communications, ``borrowing'' monitors without authorization, shutting off
network access without warning, and lying to get information he wants) and those of
hackers. He points out Stoll's use of pejorative words such as ``varmint'' to describe
hackers, and Stoll's quote of a colleague: ``They're technically skilled but ethically
bankrupt programmers without any respect for others' work -- or privacy. They're not
destroying one or two programs. They're trying to wreck the cooperation that builds our
networks.'' [Stoll90, p. 159] Thomas writes ``at an intellectual level, [Stoll] provides a
persuasive, but simplistic, moral imagery of the nature of right and wrong, and provides
what -- to a lay reader -- would seem a compelling justification for more statutes and
severe penalties against the computer underground. This is troublesome for two reasons.
First, it leads to a mentality of social control by law enforcement during a social phase
when some would argue we are already over-controlled. Second, it invokes a punishment
model that assumes we can stamp out behaviors to which we object if only we apprehend and
convict a sufficient number of violators. ... There is little evidence that punishment
will in the long run reduce any given offense, and the research of Gordon Meyer and I
suggests that criminalization may, in fact, contribute to the growth of the computer
underground.''
6. Public Image and Treatment
Hackers express concern about their negative public image and identity. As noted
earlier, hackers are often portrayed as being irresponsible and immoral. One hacker said
that ``government propaganda is spreading an image of our being at best, sub-human,
depraved, criminally inclined, morally corrupt, low life. We need to prove that the
activities that we are accused of (crashing systems, interfering with life support
equipment, robbing banks, and jamming 911 lines) are as morally abhorent to us as they are
to the general public.''
The public identity of an individual or group is generated in part by the actions of
the group interacting with the standards of the community observing those actions. What
then accounts for the difference between the hacker's public image and what they say about
themselves? One explanation may be the different standards. Outside the hacking community,
the simple act of breaking into systems is regarded as unethical by many. The use of
pejorative words like ``vandal'' and ``varmint'' reflect this discrepency in ethics. Even
the word ``criminal'' carries with it connotations of someone evil; hackers say they are
not criminal in this sense. Katie Hafner notes that Robert Morris, who was convicted of
launching the Internet worm, was likened to a terrorist even though the worm did not
destroy data [Hafner90].
Distortions of events and references to potential threats also create an image of
persons who are dangerous. Regarding the 911 incident where a hacker downloaded a file
from Bell South, Goldstein reported ``Quickly, headlines screamed that hackers had broken
into the 911 system and were interfering with emergency telephone calls to the police. One
newspaper report said there were no indications that anyone had died or been injured as a
result of the intrusions. What a relief. Too bad it wasn't true.'' [Goldstein90] In fact,
the hackers involved with the 911 text file had not broken into the 911 system. The dollar
losses attributed to hacking incidents also are often highly inflated.
Thomas and Meyer [ThomasMeyer90] say that the rhetoric depicting hackers as a dangerous
evil contributes to a ``witch hunt'' mentality, wherein a group is first labeled as
dangerous, and then enforcement agents are mobilized to exorcise the alleged social evil.
They see the current sweeps against hackers as part of a reaction to a broader fear of
change, rather than to the actual crimes committed.
Hackers say they are particularly concerned that computer security professionals and
system managers do not appear to understand hackers or be interested in their concerns.
Hackers say that system managers treat them like enemies and criminals, rather than as
potential helpers in their task of making their systems secure. This may reflect managers'
fears about hackers, as well as their responsibilities to protect the information on their
systems. Stallman says that the strangers he encounters using his account are more likely
to have a chip on their shoulder than in the past; he attributes this to a harsh enforcer
mentality adopted by the establishment. He says that network system managers start out
with too little trust and a hostile attitude toward strangers that few of the strangers
deserve. One hacker said that system managers show a lack of openness to those who want to
learn.
Stallman also says that the laws make the hacker scared to communicate with anyone even
slightly ``official,'' because that person might try to track the hacker down and have him
or her arrested. Drake raised the issue of whether the laws could differentiate between
malicious and nonmalicious hacking, in support of a ``kinder, gentler'' relationship
between hackers and computer security people. In fact, many states such as California
initially passed computer crime laws that excluded malicious hacking; it was only later
that these laws were amended to include nonmalicious actions [HollingerLanza-Kaduce88].
Hollinger and Lanza-Kaduce speculate that these amendments and other new laws were
catalyzed mainly by media events, especially the reports on the ``414 hackers'' and the
movie ``War Games,'' which created a perception of hacking as extremely dangerous, even if
that perception was not based on facts.
Hackers say they want to help system managers make their systems more secure. They
would like managers to recognize and use their knowledge about design flaws and the
outsider threat problem. Landreth [Landreth89] suggests ways in which system managers can
approach hackers in order to turn them into colleagues, and Goodfellow also suggests
befriending hackers [Goodfellow83]. John Draper (Cap'n Crunch) says it would help if
system managers and the operators of phone companies and switches could coopererate in
tracing a hacker without bringing in law enforcement authorities.
Drake suggests giving hackers free access in exchange for helping with security, a
suggestion that I also heard from several hackers. Drake says that the current attitude of
treating hackers as enemies is not very conducive to a solution, and by belittling them,
we only cause ourselves problems.
I asked some of the hackers whether they'd be interested in breaking into systems if
the rules of the ``game'' were changed so that instead of being threatened by prosecution,
they were invited to leave a ``calling card'' giving their name, phone number, and method
of breaking in. In exchange, they would get recognition and points for each vulnerability
they discovered. Most were interested in playing; one hacker said he would prefer monetary
reward since he was supporting himself. Any system manager interested in trying this out
could post a welcome message inviting hackers to leave their cards. This approach could
have the advantage of not only letting the hackers contribute to the security of the
system, but of allowing the managers to quickly recognize the potentially malicious
hackers, since they are unlikely to leave their cards. Perhaps if hackers are given the
opportunity to make contributions outside the underground, this will dampen their desire
to pursue illegal activities.
Several hackers said that they would like to be able to pursue their activities legally
and for income. They like breaking into systems, doing research on computer security, and
figuring out how to protect against vulnerabilities. They say they would like to be in a
position where they have permission to hack systems. Goodfellow suggests hiring hackers to
work on tiger teams that are commissioned to locate vulnerabilities in systems through
penetration testing. Baird Info-Systems Safeguards, Inc., a security consulting firm,
reports that they have employed hackers on several assignments [Baird87]. They say the
hackers did not violate their trust or the trust of their clients, and performed in an
outstanding manner. Baird believes that system vulnerabilities can be better identified by
employing people who have exploited systems.
One hacker suggested setting up a clearinghouse that would match hackers with companies
that could use their expertise, while maintaining anonymity of the hackers and ensuring
confidentiality of all records. Another hacker, in describing an incident where he
discovered a privileged account without a password, said ``What I (and others) wish for is
a way that hackers can give information like this to a responsible source, AND HAVE
HACKERS GIVEN CREDIT FOR HELPING! As it is, if someone told them that `I'm a hacker, and I
REALLY think you should know...' they would freak out, and run screaming to the SS [Secret
Service] or the FBI. Eventually, the person who found it would be caught, and hauled away
on some crazy charge. If they could only just ACCEPT that the hacker was trying to help!''
The clearinghouse could also provide this type of service.
Hackers are also interested in security policy issues. Drake expressed concern over how
we handle information about computer security vulnerabilities. He argues that it is better
to make this information public than cover it up and pretend that it does not exist, and
cites the CERT to illustrate how this approach can be workable. Other hackers, however,
argue for restricting initial dissemination of flaws to customers and users. Drake also
expressed concern about the role of the government, particularly the military, in
cryptography. He argues that NSA's opinion on a cryptographic standard should be taken
with a large grain of salt because of their code breaking role.
Some security specialists are opposed to hiring hackers for security work, and Eugene
Spafford has urged people not to do business with any company that hires a convicted
hacker to work in the security area [ACM90]. He says that ``This is like having a known
arsonist install a fire alarm.'' But, the laws are such that a person can be convicted for
having done nothing other than break into a system; no serious damage (i.e., no ``computer
arson'') is necessary. Many of our colleagues admit to having broken into systems in the
past, e.g., Geoff Goodfellow [Goodfellow83] and Brian Reid [Frenkel87]; Reid is quoted as
saying that because of the knowledge he gained breaking into systems as a kid, he was
frequently called in to help catch people who break in. Spafford says that times have
changed, and that this method of entering the field is no longer socially acceptable, and
fails to provide adequate training in computer science and computer engineering
[Spafford89]. However, from what I have observed, many hackers do have considerable
knowledge about telecommunications, data security, operating systems, programming
languages, networks, and cryptography. But, I am not challenging a policy to hire
competent people of sound character. Rather, I am challenging a strict policy that uses
economic pressure to close a field of activity to all persons convicted of breaking into
systems. It is enough that a company is responsible for the behavior of its employees.
Each hacker can be considered for employment based on his or her own competency and
character.
Some people have called for stricter penalties for hackers, including prison terms, in
order to send a strong deterrent message to hackers. John Draper, who was incarcerated for
his activities in the 1970's, argues that in practice this will only make the problem
worse. He told me that he was forced under threat to teach other inmates his knowledge of
communications systems. He believes that prison sentences will serve only to spread
hacker's knowledge to career criminals. He said he was never approached by criminals
outside the prison, but that inside the prison they had control over him.
One hacker said that by clamping down on the hobbyist underground, we will only be left
with the criminal underground. He said that without hackers to uncover system
vulnerabilities, the holes will be left undiscovered, to be utilized by those likely to
cause real damage.
Goldstein argues that the existing penalties are already way out of proportion to the
acts committed, and that the reason is because of computers [Goldstein89]. He says that if
Kevin Mitnick had committed crimes similar to those he committed but without a computer,
he would have been classified as a mischief maker and maybe fined $100 for trespassing;
instead, he was put in jail without bail [Goldstein89]. Craig Neidorf, a publisher and
editor of the electronic newsletter ``Phrack,'' faces up to 31 years and a fine of
$122,000 for receiving, editing, and transmitting the downloaded text file on the 911
system [Goldstein90].
7. Privacy and the First and Fourth Amendments
The hackers I spoke with advocated privacy protection for sensitive information about
individuals. They said they are not interested in invading people's privacy, and that they
limited their hacking activities to acquiring information about computer systems or how to
break into them. There are, of course, hackers who break into systems such as the TRW
credit database. Emanuel Goldstein argues that such invasions of privacy took place before
the hacker arrived [Harpers90]. Referring to credit reports, government files, motor
vehicle records, and the ``megabytes of data piling up about each of us,'' he says that
thousands of people legally can see and use this data, much of it erroneous. He claims
that the public has been misinformed about the databases, and that hackers have become
scapegoats for the holes in the systems. One hacker questioned the practice of storing
sensitive personal information on open systems with dial-up access, the accrual of the
information, the methods used to acquire it, and the purposes to which it is put. Another
hacker questioned the inclusion of religion and race in credit records.
Drake told me that he was concerned about the increasing amount of information about
individuals that is stored in large data banks, and the inability of the individual to
have much control over the use of that information. He suggests that the individual might
be co-owner of information collected about him or her, with control over the use of that
information. He also says that an individual should be free to withhold personal
information, of course paying the consequences of doing so (e.g., not getting a drivers
license or credit card). (In fact, all Federal Government forms are required to contain a
Privacy Act Statement that states how the information being collected will be used and, in
some cases, giving the option of withholding the information.)
Goldstein has also challenged the practices of law enforcement agencies in their
attempt to crack down on hackers [Goldstein90]. He said that all incoming and outgoing
electronic mail used by ``Phrack'' was monitored before the newsletter was shutdown by
authorities. ``Had a printed magazine been shut down in this fashion after having all of
their mail opened and read, even the most thick-headed sensationalist media types would
have caught on: hey, isn't that a violation of the First Amendment?'' He also cites the
shutdown of several bulletin boards as part of Operation Sun Devil, and quotes the
administrator of the bulletin board Zygot as saying ``Should I start reading my users'
mail to make sure they aren't saying anything naughty? Should I snoop through all the
files to make sure everyone is being good? This whole affair is rather chilling.'' The
administrator for the public system The Point wrote ``Today, there is no law or precedent
which affords me ... the same legal rights that other common carriers have against
prosecution should some other party (you) use my property (The Point) for illegal
activities. That worries me ...''
About 40 personal computer systems and 23,000 data disks were seized under Operation
Sun Devil, a two-year investigation involving the FBI, Secret Service, and other federal
and local law enforcement officials. In addition, the Secret Service acknowledges that its
agents, acting as legitimate users, had secretly monitored computer bulletin boards
[Markoff90a]. Markoff reports that California Representative Don Edwards, industry leader
Mitchell Kapor, and civil liberties advocates are alarmed by these government actions,
saying that they challenge freedom of speech under the First Amendment and protection
against searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Markoff asks: ``Will fear of
hackers bring oppression?''
John Barlow writes ``The Secret Service may actually have done a service for those of
us who love liberty. They have provided us with a devil. And devils, among their other
galvanizing virtues, are just great for clarifying the issues and putting iron in your
spine.'' [Barlow90] Some of the questions that Barlow says need to be addressed include
``What are data and what is free speech? How does one treat property which has no physical
form and can be infinitely reproduced? Is a computer the same as a printing press?''
Barlow urges those of us who understand the technology to address these questions, lest
the answers be given to us by law makers and law enforcers who do not. Barlow and Kapor
are constituting the Computer Liberty Foundation to ``raise and disburse funds for
education, lobbying, and litigation in the areas relating to digital speech and the
extension of the Constitution into Cyberspace.''
8. Conclusions
Hackers say that it is our social responsibility to share information, and that it is
information hoarding and disinformation that are the crimes. This ethic of resource and
information sharing contrasts sharply with computer security policies that are based on
authorization and ``need to know.'' This discrepancy raises an interesting question: Does
the hacker ethic reflects a growing force in society that stands for greater sharing of
resources and information -- a reaffirmation of basic values in our constitution and laws?
It is important that we examine the differences between the standards of hackers, systems
managers, users, and the public. These differences may represent breakdowns in current
practices, and may present new opportunities to design better policies and mechanisms for
making computer resources and information more widely available.
The sentiment for greater information sharing is not restricted to hackers. In the best
seller ``Thriving on Chaos,'' Tom Peters [Peters87] writes about sharing within
organizations: ``Information hoarding, especially by politically motivated, power-seeking
staffs, has been commonplace throughout American industry, service and manufacturing
alike. It will be an impossible millstone around the neck of tomorrow's organizations.
Sharing is a must.'' Peters argues that information flow and sharing is fundamental to
innovation and competetiveness. On a broader scale, Peter Drucker [Drucker89] says that
the ``control of information by government is no longer possible. Indeed, information is
now transnational. Like money, it has no `fatherland.' ''
Nor is the sentiment restricted to people outside the computer security field. Harry
DeMaio [DeMaio89] says that our natural urge is to share information, and that we are
suspicious of organizations and individuals who are secretive. He says that information is
exchanged out of ``want to know'' and mutual accommodation rather than ``need to know.''
If this is so, then some of our security policies are out of step with the way people
work. Peter Denning [DenningP89] says that information sharing will be widespread in the
emerging worldwide networks of computers and that we need to focus on ``immune systems''
that protect against mistakes in our designs and recover from damage.
I began my investigation of hackers with the question: who are they and what is their
culture and discourse? My investigation uncovered some of their concerns, which provided
the organizational structure to this paper, and several suggestions for new actions that
might be taken. My investigation also opened up a broader question: What are the clashing
discourses that the hackers stand at the battle lines of? Is it owning or restricting
information vs. sharing information -- a tension between an age-old tradition of
controlling information as property and the Englightenment tradition of sharing and
disseminating information? Is it controlling access based on ``need to know,'' as
determined by the information provider, vs. ``want to know,'' as determined by the person
desiring access? Is it law enforcement vs. freedoms granted under the First and Fourth
Amendments? The answers to these questions, as well as those raised by Barlow on the
nature of information and free speech, are important because they tell us whether our
policies and practices serve us as well as they might. The issue is not simply hackers vs.
system managers or law enforcers; it is a much larger question about values and practices
in an information society.
Acknowledgments
I am deeply grateful to Peter Denning, Frank Drake, Nathan Estey, Katie Hafner, Brian
Harvey, Steve Lipner, Teresa Lunt, Larry Martin, Gordon Meyer, Donn Parker, Morgan
Schweers, Richard Stallman, and Alex for their comments on earlier versions of this paper
and helpful discussions; to Richard Stallman for putting me in contact with hackers; John
Draper, Geoff Goodfellow, Brian Reid, Eugene Spafford, and the hackers for helpful
discussions; and Richard Pethia for a summary of some of his experiences at CERT. The
opinions expressed here, however, are my own and do not necessarily represent those of the
people mentioned above or of Digital Equipment Corporation.
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