Rogues, Rascals and Outlaws:

Politics and The Organizing of Crime in Rural Areas

Gary W. Potter

Despite the fact there is no systematic effort to count and report cases of public corruption in the United States, there is a public recognition that political corruption is widespread. Journalistic exposes, whether print or electronic; reports of regulatory agencies; testimony before congressional committees; and information emanating from scholarly studies all indicate that corruption exists at every level of government. For example, the Public Integrity Section of the U.S. Department of Justice, while seriously understaffed with only 24 full-time attorneys assigned to prosecute all violations of federal corruption statutes for the entire United States, still managed to secure 6,261 indictments of public officials between 1974 and 1983 (Public Integrity Section, 1984: 40). The ABSCAM and Greylord investigations resulted in the indictments of members of Congress and the judiciary for bribery and influence peddling. Participant observation research by criminologists has uncovered an extensive web of corrupt crime networks which unite politicians, businessmen, and organized crime figures in cities such as Seattle; Reading, Pennsylvania; Detroit; Philadelphia; New York City; and London (Albini, 1971; Block, 1984; Block and Chambliss, 1981; Block and Scarpitti, 1985; Chambliss, 1978; Gardiner, 1970; Jenkins and Potter, 1986, 1989; Potter and Jenkins, 1985).

While there is a robust literature addressing political corruption, its focus has been on international and national scandals or corruption in major metropolitan areas (Benson, 1978; Coleman, 1989; Douglas and Johnson, 1977; Simon and Eitzen, 1978). Despite the general neglect of rural areas by journalists, government investigators and scholars, corruption is as real and as important to the quality of life in rural areas as it is any major metropolitan area. The forms of corruption may be simpler, the profits less, and the modalities more direct in a rural setting, but the basic elements of political corruption still exist and thrive.

It is the purpose of this discussion to explore the varieties and forms of corruption in a rural setting, "Copperhead County". Forms of graft, influence peddling, election fraud and law enforcement corruption that are to be found in such settings, the forces which drive corrupt relations, and the impact on the community will be examined.

"Copperhead County"

"Copperhead County" is one of the 120 counties in Kentucky and one of the 49 counties classified as Appalachian counties (Lee, 1981). Copperhead County is 474 square miles with a population of about 16,000, down about 30% since 1950. There are two towns, the county seat with a population of around 1,500 and another with a population of about 800. Farming is a basic industry, however the number of farms has declined by 70% since 1954 to about 700 working farms in existence today (Lee, 1981).

In the past, Copperhead County's economy has been supported by coal. Most of the coal reserves are owned by absentee companies and production has steadily declined 57% since 1966, to about 500,000 tons of coal produced today. During that same period about half of the jobs in the coal industry also disappeared, with fewer than 300 county residents presently employed in the industry. Another absentee industry which has exploited and then abandoned Copperhead County is the timber industry. Eighty percent of the county's land area is in timber, but declining profits have reduced employment and output. Today there about 475 manufacturing jobs available in the county (Kentucky Commerce Cabinet, 1986; Lee, 1981).

The economy of Copperhead County has been on a forty year decline and residents of the county have been left in dire economic straits. About 42.4% of the population lives below the poverty level. The official unemployment rate is about 25%. Per capita income is about $7,233. A full 50% of the county's population lives on unemployment, Social Security, disability pensions or other fixed incomes. The dropout rate for the Copperhead County high schools is around 50% (Kelley, 1989).

The single largest source of income in Copperhead County is crime: bootlegging liquor; growing marijuana; transshipping cocaine; prostitution; gambling; and fraud. Copperhead County has an economy built around vice and corruption. It is a social system resting on lawlessness.

Methodology

Three sources of data were used in this study. First, historical, sociological, and anthropological studies of the area were reviewed and historical and contemporaneous information about government, politics and the organization of crime were noted (Clark, 1968; Kentucky Crime Commission, 1988; Caudill, 1983; Gazaway, 1969; Lee, 1981; Richardson, 1986; Tapp and Klotter, 1977; Maurer 1984). Second, local newspapers were searched for stories that dealt with forms of political corruption (i.e., election fraud, bribery) and law enforcement corruption (i.e., official relationships with organizations involved in the delivery of illicit goods and services). Finally, a field research design was used to become acquainted with the methods and means of political organizing, government functioning, and illicit entrepreneurship in the area (Gold, 1958).

Local Politics and Government in Kentucky

Political and law enforcement corruption in rural areas of Kentucky is considerably enhanced by two factors: (1) the power of the county under the Kentucky constitution and (2) the simplicity of rural county government.

Kentuckians have, since the founding of the Commonwealth, been more concerned with delineating limitations on the power of government than with creating a rational and workable form for that government (Clark, 1968; Ireland, 1977; Pearce, 1987). Fear of taxes, fear of bureaucracies, intense regionalism and pervasive distrust of government have combined to severely limit the power of state government in Kentucky and to make the county the major decision-making unit in local governance. Kentuckians have always felt that local elected officials, people they knew personally and people who shared similar life experiences, could best make decisions and administer their affairs. This intense localism has resulted in constitutional provisions that invest Kentucky county officials with enormous powers, while limiting the right of state government to intervene. In theory, this kind of home-based, participatory democracy represents a noble experiment in government. But in practice it has produced a quagmire that prevents the establishment of meaningful social programs, hinders effective law enforcement, and makes reforms of basic institutions, such as schools, virtually impossible. As Kentucky's premier historian, Thomas D. Clark comments (1968: 162):

The grass roots source of power of political decision making in Kentucky rests largely with the courthouse rings. ... the county became "the" government for the people. Magistrates fined or favored them with openhandedness, sheriffs tracked down criminals, taxpayers, and jurymen for fees, and clerks registered deeds, wills, and issued marriage licenses with equal zeal. All of these officials were careful to curry favor with the people.

This noble experiment in self-government and participatory democracy has failed for two basic reasons. First, Kentucky has an unwieldy proliferation of counties, 120 in all, that have produced such fragmentation in government that any issue, save the most local of them, can scarcely be addressed at all:

Conditions for progressive government were not improved when, during the early decades of the nineteenth century, the legislature spewed out counties as though on a prolonged drunk. Counties were created for any reason. Real estate dealers, eager to sell lots in the town that would grow up around a courthouse, would offer to donate land for a courthouse and jail and, on the day when the referendum on forming the county was held, would put out barrels of whiskey to influence the voters. Many counties were formed through the efforts of men who wanted only to hold the office of judge, sheriff, or jailer ...

Unfortunately, the counties continued to exist after the need for them had vanished, saddling Kentucky, apparently forever, with a multitude of unnecessary, burdensome governments. Their very existence bred provincialism and xenophobia, increasing the difficulty of persuading Kentuckians to cooperate and take concerted action for their mutual benefit. Not surprisingly, inefficient and often corrupt courthouse operations compounded the suspicion of the rural taxpayers that all politicians were crooks and all politics crooked (Pearce, 1987: 78).

Second, politics in Kentucky are "the damnedest." Politics are played with reckless abandon. The ferocity of local contests for seemingly insignificant offices have spawned election fraud, corruption, and even murder. The source of this political fervor can be found in rural poverty and the spoils to be had from political victories:

The ferocity with which Kentuckians play politics and corruption that so often marks the average courthouse the vote buying, the patronage, the selling of public services for political loyalty have their roots in that poverty. Political power is sought for the financial gain it offers; corruption is accepted, if not condoned, since the outs intend to do the same when they get in; and spoils, not service or progress, become the point of the political process (Pearce, 1987: 1).

Clark sees these political wars as battles for power:

Politics is played in Kentucky as a game, but it is played with a vengeance between the "ins" and the "outs," and the hunger of the outs for office and patronage is insatiable. Ever since the first Virginia sheriff arrived in a backwoods county to keep order there has been a yearning for public favor in Kentucky. The sheriff brought with him as the chief item of his official baggage the germ of politics. Aside from performing his constabulary duties he courted the voters to ensure his reelection. This has kept up, but the interesting thing about political campaigning in Kentucky is the intensity of the ardor with which an ignoramus seeks election to a rural constableship and that of a candidate seeking the governorship (Clark, 1968: 145).

The concept of government has been lost. It is not government which is at stake, it is power. Control of government is important, not because it means that plans can be laid for improved transportation, better schools and more efficient services, but because that control allows the officeholder to bestow favors upon his or her (usually "his") constituents. And the constituency responds in kind, expecting government to be no more than a large pork barrel from which all can seek favor and reward. Once elected to office a Kentucky politician is asked not for his vision of the future but for immediate and tangible patronage:

The man is never free from self-seekers. They spring up like India's poor from the streets holding out their bony hands crying for baksheesh. They clamor for jobs for themselves, their sons, and their daughters, they want pardons for wayward husbands, brothers, and cousins, improved roads past their doors (some have even been accused of seeking hard-surfaced drives onto their farms), they seek appointment to boards, the creation of state parks, and the location of state garages in every county, or to get a son graduated from a state college. They never give up (Clark, 1968: 146).

Governance in "Copperhead County

Government in Copperhead County is dominated by a Republican Party machine. While it is usual to think of big city machines like Tammany Hall in New York or the Daly machine in Chicago as prototypes of longevity and the abuse of political power, they can scarcely hold a candle to the Copperhead County cabal. The political machine which dominates Copperhead County has been in control of that county since the late 1840s, and while its control was sometimes tenuous, requiring a half-century long war ("feud") and some five dozen killings to solidify itself, today it enjoys total hegemony.

Copperhead County essentially has one political party, the Republican Party (Lee, 1981; Richardson, 1986; Kelly 1989). But any party distinction is irrelevant to the reality of Copperhead County. What is important are extended families. Since the founding of the county, six extended families have jockeyed for control of the county, forming alliances, splitting up and forming new alliances. Over the years they have contested for power as Democrats, KnowNothings, Americans, and since Mr. Lincoln won the war, as Republicans. There are no ideologies in Copperhead County politics. In fact, there is only one issue, power and who has it. The contest for power has been fierce. Elections are bought when they can be and taken by force when they must be. Three years ago a candidate for the local school board was shot and killed in the driveway of his home. The murder remains unsolved. Ten years ago the sheriff was shot and killed. That murder is also unsolved. In fact, in the last decade fourteen murders officially have gone unsolved, either with no arrest having been made or with the acquittal of the accused. Informants in the county assert that the real number of unsolved murders is closer to eighty.

Political power in the county is highly integrated and is organized along family lines and along syndicate lines. One extended family for many years controlled the sheriff's office, the coroner's office, the county judgeship, and the jailer's office. Their allies hold the county clerk's office and the majority of school board seats. The position of sheriff eventually passed to another machine participant because the incumbent sheriff had actually made an arrest for marijuana cultivation and had insisted that the roadhouses and jenny barns limit their operations to Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights. His own family, which is heavily involved in illicit enterprise, opposed him for reelection. The new sheriff now proudly boasts that the "poker games run twenty-four hours a day, and the whorehouses are open anytime."

The organizers of crime in the county, drug traffickers, bootleggers, roadhouse and gambling operators are highly integrated into the operations of the political cabal that governs the county. So are many local business people who share both the spoils of office and the proceeds of crime. In Copperhead County politics, crime and commerce have been so thoroughly integrated that a single powerful cabal controls both the county's bureaucracy and the county's vice.

The political machine in Copperhead County, or more appropriately the crime cabal that controls the County, maintains power and realizes profits through a massive system of graft and organized crime. Large sums of money and enormous political power are accumulated through the misuse of the public trust and the misadministration of government. That power and those profits are augmented by interests held by crime cabal members in a wide ranging and highly organized crime network that controls vice in the county.

The Politics of Corruption

Under these conditions it is no surprise that corruption, the illegal or unethical use of state authority for personal or political gain (Benson, 1978: xiii), in the form of political bribery, political kickbacks, election fraud, and corrupt campaign practices are commonplace in Copperhead County. The opportunities for graft in the day-to-day activities of local governments are great. The purchasing of goods and services, the regulation of land and commerce, the custody of public funds, tax assessment and political patronage are all abused by the Copperhead County machine (Simon and Eitzen, 1986: 170-177).

Purchasing Goods and Services

Governments make use of enormous quantities of purchased goods and services (Amick, 1976: 40-41; Benson, 1978: 11-12, 127; Simon and Eitzen, 1986: 172-173; Browning and Gerassi, 1980: 214). Roads must be repaired; buildings must be built and maintained; architectural, legal, surveying, auditing and other professional services must be contracted for; supplies must be purchased; and even automobiles and trucks must be purchased or leased. While governments have responsibility for performing a great many tasks, they neither produce the goods used, nor have a staff capable of performing the services required. These goods and services are purchased or contracted for through private vendors. Because almost everything a government does requires some kind of private purchase, an enormous amount of money and a large volume of business is available for distribution to private interests.

The purchasing of goods and services by the Copperhead County government represents one of the most significant symbiotic relationships that binds the Copperhead County cabal together. Officials can assure that purchases are made only from their supporters. By doing so they reward local businessmen for their campaign contributions and the votes they deliver to the machine. Nothing is quite as compelling to a Copperhead County voter as his or her boss making it clear that a job depends on the continuation of the present government in power.

Kentucky law requires competitive bidding for goods and services, with the exception of professional services which can be negotiated. It is felt that professional services, such as those provided by architects, engineers, and lawyers, must be open to subjective evaluation of the quality of service and, therefore, cannot always be reduced to specifications in a competitive bid. Through this loophole professionals who are loyal to the cabal are handsomely rewarded. But even in the case of competitive bidding friends are given precedence. If the county government wishes to guarantee that a friendly businessman wins a competitive bid it can and does rig that bidding process in a number of ways. First, it is common practice in Copperhead County to allow favored providers to see the other "sealed" bids prior to their opening. Second, it is equally common practice to disqualify potential bidders as unqualified or to find some other excuse to refuse acceptance of a bid. Third, it is universally understood that a low bid for goods and services may be adjusted afterwards. This adjustment occasionally takes the form of a cost overrun, but because of the paper trail left by such a device, the favored method of "low bid adjustment" is to allow the contractor never to complete the work, to do shoddy work, or to pay premium price for inferior goods. By so doing the government meets the requirement of giving contracts to low bidders, but the low bidders are able to satisfy the contract at a drastically reduced cost, thereby inflating their profits.

Not only are political friends rewarded in this system but officeholders also profit. Inflated bids or profits on shoddy and incomplete work result in kickbacks to the officials involved. A system of kickbacks from contractors to members of the board of education, the county judge executive and the magistrates, and the elected officials of the county's largest city are commonplace, expected, and simply calculated as costs of doing business. Where a kickback is inappropriate or cumbersome, an opportunity bribe is often substituted. In this case a public official is given the opportunity by a local businessman to purchase something of value at a bargain price and then resell it to the businessman or to another commercial interest at a considerable profit, a profit invariably accounted for in the contract for whatever good or service the government is purchasing. This is a particularly common arrangement if any land is involved in a specific project.

It cannot be overemphasized that the purchase of goods and services is key to the integration of the Copperhead County cabal. For example, the county, with remarkable consistency, seems to find one local automobile dealer's bids on vehicles to be of the lowest cost and the highest quality. This auto dealer gets virtually every county vehicle purchase. In return she is a major financial benefactor of the politicians running the county and she is a large-scale marijuana trafficker, supporting not only the cultivation of the marijuana crop, but also providing significant money laundering services to the growers. Everyone benefits from the arrangement and it unites the three cornerstones of the cabal: politics, crime, and business.

The Use of Public Funds

Another area of government activity which is rife with corruption is the housing of public funds (Benson, 1978: 11, 27; Simon and Eitzen, 1986: 171-172). The county, the school board and the city government collect tax money and receive funds from federal and state sources. These funds must be housed in a bank. But the question becomes what bank? What kind of account? At what rate of interest? In Copperhead County this is not as difficult a question as in some other counties, or indeed as in a major urban area. There are only two banks from which to choose. As a result government funds are invested equally in both banks and the bankers' advice as to what type of account and the appropriate interest rate is invariably accepted. As a result the banks profit quite nicely. But even here, with a limited range of opportunities for corruption because of the limited choice of banks, the cabal manages to strengthen its position.

First, bankers stay on friendly terms with local officials, not wishing to offend anyone or do anything that adversely impacts on their commercial welfare. Government officials and even nongovernmental cabal participants can expect preferential treatment: easily obtaining loans; preferred customer status and service; and information and advice on profit-making opportunities in the county. But even more important is the fact that the banks, in their desire to retain cordial working relations with the local officials, are only too happy to further the high degree of integration between government and business already existing in the county by appointing cabal leaders to the bank boards. This allows public officials and others to profit not only from information and services provided but from their private financial interests in the banks themselves. It also gives them an opportunity to influence bank policies on other matters. In this regard it is extremely important in Copperhead County that the banks have in place mechanisms to facilitate the laundering of drug money during the marijuana harvests. By directing drug profits into the banking system public officials not only impact positively on the bank's profitability but also provide a major service to the marijuana industry, having an already established mechanism for the conversion of drug money in place.

The Regulation of Land, Public Property and Commercial Activities

In urban areas land use regulations constitute one of the most fertile areas for graft and corruption (Benson, 1978; Amick, 1976; Simon and Eitzen, 1986: 172174). In Copperhead County, however, land use and zoning is unheard of and is widely regarded by local residents as the first step down a slippery slope toward totalitarianism. The fierceness with which rural Kentuckians protect their "rights" to do anything they please with their land is legendary. But the absence of zoning and land use regulations does not mean that the Copperhead County cabal is unable to facilitate dysfunctional activities with regard to land and property rights.

Copperhead County industry is predicated on timber and coal, industries which make intensive use of land. While County officials control very little land (there is no public park system at the local level in Copperhead County) they can turn a blind eye to logging activity on state land, on unincorporated land, and even on some remote but private land. Similarly the cabal fails to notice the widespread practice of illegal mining in the county. While legitimate coal mining has been drastically declining, the illegal mining of coal is becoming far more common. Illegal coal mining has some obvious benefits: (1) environmental regulations can be overlooked; (2) miners in illegal operations are paid wages well below the industry standard; (3) there are no fringe benefits (medical plans or insurance) to dilute profits; and, (4) they are off the tax rolls, with employers paying no state or federal income taxes, no social security taxes, and no unemployment insurance on the workers. While Copperhead County officials have no direct responsibility for controlling this activity, they can apply political pressure to outside agencies to stay clear of Copperhead County. Illegal operations are not reported to the proper authorities, and local officials provide no assistance to investigators and regulators.

Because both business and political members of the Copperhead County cabal benefit financially from illegal timber and mining activity, they have pulled a tight "green curtain" over any environmental and employment crimes committed in the county. This has facilitated another industry in Copperhead County from which more palpable forms of graft accrue.

This illegal industry is the dumping of toxic wastes. While this is a relatively new form of environmental deviance for Copperhead County it is establishing a firm foothold. Midnight dumping of toxic wastes by illegal dumpers has become a major industry in the United States (Block and Scarpitti, 1985). With the passage of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act in 1973, industry was required to conform basic standards in the disposal of dangerous toxic wastes. The cost of this disposal, if done properly and in accordance with the regulations, was increased significantly. In order to abrogate this drastic cost increase a number of toxic waste disposal companies, many with organized crime connections, popped up and offered to dispose of this waste at a greatly diminished cost. The toxic wastes were disposed of in dangerous ways, and often near major population centers. Wastes were mixed with home heating oil, dumped in municipal sewage systems, and deposited on public lands. As environmental concern has increased and investigations of midnight dumpers intensified, these companies began to look for less conspicuous sites for waste disposal. The counties of Eastern Kentucky, lightly populated as they are with vast stretches of forest land and abandoned mine pits, became a likely site for illegal disposal. Copperhead County was recognized by waste disposal companies as far away as New Jersey as a propitious site for their activities. Toxic waste disposal requires the cooperation of county officials for several reasons. First, the truckers hauling the waste into the county are not local and need direction and guidance as to where to dump their cargo. Second, the presence of trucks from out of state in a county as insular as Copperhead County could not be accomplished without notice. As a result, dumpers have utilized a very straightforward strategy in toxic waste disposal. Waste disposal companies directly contact county officials, select sites for the dumping, arrange for escorts for the trucks usually consisting of auxiliary deputy sheriffs, and arrange for the payment of appropriate bribes to facilitate the illegal dumping. While this arrangement is good for the cabal it threatens the health and safety of untold numbers of county residents as dangerous carcinogens and poisons are deposited on county land.

Tax Assessment and Collection

The power to levy and collect taxes is one of the most important powers of local governments everywhere (Amick, 1976: 98-99; Benson, 1978: 12, 81-82; Simon and Eitzen, 1986: 173). This is even more true in Kentucky where resistance to taxation of any kind has historically been strong (Ireland, 1977: 124-132). In Copperhead County control of the property value administrators office is one of the keys to the maintenance of political power. Contests for this office and the sheriff's office were the precipitating events in the sixty year war for control of Copperhead County discussed earlier (Richardson, 1986).

The property value administrator assesses the value of personal property for purposes of taxation (Ireland, 1977: 37-38, 124-125). This includes not just the value of houses and land, but also cars, trucks, other vehicular equipment, out buildings, and the like. A political machine can both reward its friends and punish its enemies through the valuation of property, and this system of rewards and punishments is used with potent efficiency in Copperhead County. Allies of the political machine can expect their property to be assessed at rates representing 25 percent to 33 percent of its actual market value, enemies can expect a full valuation to appear on the tax rolls. The process for challenging an assessment is cumbersome, expensive and time consuming, and in Copperhead County, where a wide range of official sanctions exist to tame political opponents, challenging the property value administrator is simply not worth the trouble. Tax assessment is the most effective form of patronage available to the rural political machine. Newspaper exposes have pointed to homes, easily worth $250,000 or more on the open market, which carry the same property assessment as an aged, two bedroom bungalow worth $35,000. The tax savings to the rich are enormous and guarantee not only continued political support, but a highly integrated system of exchanges of favors and influence in all aspects of government and politics.

While the property value administrator's office is vital for political patronage it also uses tax values as a general campaign device. Unless an individual is an avowed enemy of the political machine, he or she can expect property to be assessed at about 5060 percent of market value. This is a potent vote gathering technique. The property value administrator is sure to inform property owners that they are getting a significant break on the tax rolls and that this break is a direct result of the local machine's beneficence. In an area of the state where tax resentment is high and resistance to paying taxes the most compelling political issue, the machinations of the tax assessor are the most efficient way of spreading the machine's largess to the largest number of people.

The effects of underassessment are dramatic. Because property value taxes are the most significant source of revenue for local government, Copperhead County's treasury is forever inadequate and the government is forever under-funded. Road repairs are not done, the old jail was so decrepit that escape requires no imagination or effort at all, and other basic services, such as libraries, are nonexistent. But the impact of tax patronage is greatest in the educational system. Because the schools are entirely supported on property taxes, the Copperhead County school system has been inadequately funded for the past century. The school buildings are in disrepair. The number of school buses in this rural county are inadequate, requiring that in some areas of the county, children leave for school at 6 a.m. The schools have too few teachers. In order to pay for basic school supplies (e.g., pencils, chalk, paper) students are required to sell candy door-to-door in the county. The vending machine revenue in the school buildings is counted on as a basic source of school funding. And students are charged a rental fee for the use of outdated, badly maintained textbooks. The hopeless inadequacy of the Copperhead County schools, resulting in large part from inadequate taxes, perpetuates a cycle of poverty that also serves the interests of the local political machine. As long as Copperhead County residents are locked into a hopeless cycle of unemployment, underemployment, and inadequate education which makes it difficult or impossible to get jobs elsewhere, the population remains dependent on the favors provided by the politically powerful.

Political Patronage

If there is a compelling political issue in Copperhead County that rivals taxes for public attention it is jobs. But when residents speak of jobs, they are not talking about programs for attracting industry or remedying under-employment through better education, they are talking about political patronage. In a county where real unemployment hovers at 54.3 percent, a job is highly prized possession. And jobs are controlled by the county political cabal.

Most obviously there are governmental jobs to be considered. The school board employs bus drivers, janitorial staff, and maintenance personnel, in total about four dozen persons. The county clerk and other county officers employ roughly another two dozen people, the roads department adds an additional twenty or so jobs, and the sheriff's office, despite the fact that Copperhead County is a very small, rural county, employs twenty two part-time deputies. None of these jobs are covered by civil service provisions. They are all direct political appointments. And while none of these jobs offers more than a subsistence salary, by Copperhead County standards they are highly prized and vigorously sought. In order to get one of these public jobs a record of absolute political loyalty to the cabal must be established. Electioneering is required. But even more important is the delivery of blocs of votes. In rural Eastern Kentucky counties, the extended family plays a key role in social life. A single county or school district employee is related to dozens, even hundreds, of other county residents. Just as important is the requirement that county employees demonstrate total loyalty to the cabal. Secrecy surrounding the workings of local government must be maintained. Protection of the cabal is vital to their continued employment and secrecy is a basic rule of government service.

While direct exploitation of government workers occurs only in those jobs which are not protected by state law, some exploitation of other government employees also occurs. Teachers, for example, are protected by state law against political interference, and are limited in their political activities. However, in Copperhead County one is far more likely to be hired, even to a protected position, if he or she is recognized as being on the right side of the political power structure. Just like political appointees, civil service workers go to extremes to not cause trouble in the county. Talking to outsiders or complaining about conditions is likely to result in concerted efforts by superiors to find sufficient cause to terminate one's employment.

Election Fraud

Vote buying and election fraud are fine old Kentucky traditions in the eastern mountains. In years past money and whiskey determined the outcome of many local elections. During the era of paper ballots, the blank ballot was the favored method of vote buying and election fraud:

In earlier days a discreet distribution of dollar bills and the use of "chain ballots" accomplished wonders. A local boss secured a blank official ballot, maybe from someone sacrificing his vote; the ballot was marked and traded all day for unmarked ones. The venal voter got a dollar for his vote, but only if he fetched out a blank ballot to keep the chain continuous (Clark, 1968: 163).

Electronic voting machines have made the chain ballot obsolete. But election fraud continues in new and more clever guises.

In Copperhead County the cabal not only maintains its own power through election fraud, but trades favors with statewide officials in return for votes promised and delivered in elections. Vote buying is still common although it is more cumbersome these days. Because of scandals involving vote buying, the state attorney general has instituted a spot check system in which state police officers and attorney general's office staff are often at the polls. This makes vote buying difficult. Under normal conditions money would be given to a voter and an election official would accompany the voter into the voting booth and either vote for him or watch him vote. With state police or deputy attorney generals in attendance this cannot happen. However, because vote fraud is so widespread in Eastern Kentucky, monitors cannot be everywhere and in those cases where a state policeman or other state official cannot be present, a county official is used to monitor voting. In Copperhead County this translates to the cabal overseeing their own vote buying.

Vote buying is supplemented by a variety of other election frauds, frauds which will work whether or not an election monitor is in attendance. The most common type of election fraud is illegal registration. Illegal registration means that a voter is registered in a precinct where he or she does not live using a fraudulent address. Where most addresses are rural delivery routes elaborate subterfuge is not required to accomplish this. Once a fraudulent voter is registered it is only necessary to find a body to actually go and vote. In Copperhead County this is accomplished by using "floaters" a group of individuals who go from polling place to polling place voting in the name of fraudulent registrants, or even deceased residents. The "floaters" are given some kind of identification, usually by the county clerk's office or the sheriff and simply go around the county voting early and often.

If all else fails election officials themselves can commit forgery and false accounting of returns. Absentee ballots can be remarked or forged. Vote counts can be improperly reported.

In an analysis of a century of Kentucky voting behavior by county it was not unusual to return 110 percent or more of its potential vote, and there was no telling how much in excess of voters registered. It has been said that some election boards in selected counties have held up the count until they could learn how big a vote was needed to achieve victory (Clark, 1968: 163).

Political Corruption and Organized Crime

In Copperhead County cooperation between those in political power, vice purveyors and local businessmen has created an integrated system of crime and corruption which can rival and even surpass that of a major city. The nature of crime as a business requires official corruption. Bootleggers, gamblers, and prostitutes in Copperhead County operate from fixed locations, on a predictable schedule, and do a volume business. The roadhouses, jenny barns, tanning salons, illegal liquor stores and game rooms must be accessible, must have a permanent location, and must have regular hours of business. To operate in any other way would so seriously disrupt business that it would be impossible to function or realize any appreciable profit. A retail vice establishment, in a small county, can scarcely evade the attention of political officials and law enforcement officers.

To a significant degree, the same is true of the marijuana industry. Marijuana growers operate in permanent, although less accessible locations. In a county that is only 434 square miles in area and has twenty-two official and auxiliary deputy sheriffs as well as a municipal police force, it is highly probable that the location of at least a few marijuana plots will come to law enforcement attention serendipitously, even if no real effort is made to find them. But in Copperhead County serendipity plays no role in law enforcement. Growers and processors enjoy full protection of the Copperhead County cabal. It is inconceivable that illicit gambling, prostitution, alcohol and drugs could be delivered on a regular and continual basis without the knowledge of government officials, law enforcers, and "legitimate" businessmen in the community.

While this relationship may be obvious, it does not tell us why "respectable" citizens in positions of public trust tolerate and cooperate with this illicit activity. Why does corruption, on the scale required to support so much illicit commerce, exist? The situation in Copperhead County suggests that rather than purely venal considerations, corruption is quite functional, not just for organized crime groups who are dependent on it, but for the institutions of government themselves.

First, corrupt relations between organized crime groups and local government actually strengthen social control in the community (Mastrofski and Potter, 1987; Potter and Cox, 1990). Through a process of selective enforcement, where inefficient, slothful, and potentially troublesome entrepreneurs can be weeded out, organizational strain is reduced and the potential for violence is reduced. This is particularly important in the highly volatile marijuana industry in Copperhead County. A policy of selective enforcement allows law enforcement officials to select allies who, if strengthened and allowed to expand their control of the illicit market, will fashion and enforce a set of norms which actually enhances social control. Copperhead County's largest marijuana processing network serves this function admirably. In return for a policy of non-enforcement, and dismissal of charges when enforcement is carried out by outside agencies, this network supervises the process of marijuana cultivation, the modes of production and transportation, and sets the wholesale price for the entire county thereby providing structure and stability in a highly volatile market. To a lesser degree the same is true of the other basic vice industries in the county. A system of corruption facilitates the establishment of certain norms of conduct in the liquor, gambling and prostitution industries which limit the potential for trouble.

Second, corrupt relations allow political and law enforcement officials to respond to community pressure. Once again, the marijuana industry serves as a perfect example. Even those community members who do not participate directly in marijuana cultivating and processing benefit from the influx of capital into the community. Disposable income is produced and spent locally. Shopkeepers, merchants, and bankers are the indirect beneficiaries of organized crime, and while they may deplore drug trafficking, they are less sanguine about giving up the business which accompanies it.

With regard to liquor, gambling and prostitution there is a sizable market in the county for these services. A majority of voters may well favor "dry" laws. But that does not mean that a significant portion of the community does not desire a drink now and again. Bootlegging involves the transportation and distribution of a bulky commodity, not easily concealed. Illegal liquor sales are easy to detect, conducted more or less in the open, operated during regular hours and in permanent locations. Law enforcement officers know about most bootleggers, certainly the largest of them are well known. But there is a political danger in pursuing them. Not only will the sheriff lose the votes of the bootleggers, but quite probably of their customers if he actively pursues them. Gambling represents a similar scenario. While gambling may be illegal, it is not always illegal in Kentucky. Support and official encouragement of wagering on thoroughbreds is an important source of tax revenue, jobs, and income in Kentucky. The distinction between betting at the track and off the track is often hard to understand. Similarly the distinction between betting on a horse or a roll of the dice or a turn of the card is often only semantic. Many people gamble and the political cost of enforcement far exceeds any benefits. A policy of accommodation and corruption allows people who demand access to these goods and services to satisfy their needs while at the same time placing limits and controls on how these goods and services are delivered (Chambliss, 1978: 90 91; Hills, 1969).

Third, political and law enforcement officials recognize the severe constraints under which they must operate. Copperhead County is a very poor county. Investigating the delivery of illicit goods and services is an expensive proposition, one that interferes with other duties such as collecting taxes, staffing the courts, and patrolling the highways. To governments that cannot afford undercover investigations, sting operations, and the use of electronic surveillance devices, a tolerance policy is most attractive.

The fact that corruption may be functional is certainly a motivating force. But, in Copperhead County corruption has gone well beyond being functional. In Copperhead County corruption has evolved into a crime cabal. Virtually every political and law enforcement official in Copperhead County benefits directly from the operations of organized crime networks. The substantial profits realized by marijuana traffickers, bootleggers, and gamblers make it possible to offer substantial inducements which encourage the non-enforcement of the law. Campaign contributions, investment opportunities, and the distribution of ill-gotten gains to local businesses create a powerful incentive to nurture the crime industry. This is not a situation peculiar to Copperhead County. In fact, several studies of organized crime show that the organizers of crime are often those who occupy positions of public trust (Gardiner, 1970; Chambliss, 1978; Potter and Jenkins, 1985; Gardiner and Lyman, 1978; Lupsha, 1987). Politicians, businessmen and organized criminals, whether urban or rural, are players in a market place where money, contacts, and a willingness and capacity to undertake illegal acts are regularly exchanged.

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Gary Potter is a professor of Police Studies at Eastern Kentucky University. He has written several books and journal articles on organized crime, drugs and vice.